Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
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Publication:682470
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0974-zzbMath1392.91101DBLPjournals/scw/Bade16OpenAlexW1917062946WikidataQ59471071 ScholiaQ59471071MaRDI QIDQ682470
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0974-z
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites Work
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