Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
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Publication:682475
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0981-0zbMath1392.91124OpenAlexW2121331923MaRDI QIDQ682475
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0981-0
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Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
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