Non-bossiness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:682486
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0987-7zbMath1392.91111OpenAlexW4243133889MaRDI QIDQ682486
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0987-7
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
- When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Manipulation through bribes
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- On cores and indivisibility
- A characterization of the Walras rule
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Coalitional manipulation on networks
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: improvement of the supremal welfare loss
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
- Divide-and-permute
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
- The Bargaining Problem
- The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
