Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0990-zzbMath1392.91039OpenAlexW2513521725WikidataQ59460070 ScholiaQ59460070MaRDI QIDQ682489

Ayşe Müge Yüksel, Rene Saran, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters

Publication date: 2 February 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingDuverger's lawelectoral competitionstrategic party formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law ⋮ Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

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