Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7zbMath1395.91210OpenAlexW2750300335MaRDI QIDQ683517

Jaideep Roy, Nejat Anbarci

Publication date: 8 February 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/26049/1/26049.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencysunspotsbalanced budgetdouble auctions (DA)no-loss constraint (NLC)uniform price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Incentives in Teams
• Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
• A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

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