Bargaining with habit formation

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0994-ZzbMath1398.91297OpenAlexW20746711MaRDI QIDQ683826

Bahar Leventoğlu

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintybehavioral economicsbargaininghabit formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Comparison utility in a growth model
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
• A theory of reference-dependent behavior
• Habit formation and indeterminacy in overlapping generations models
• Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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