Sticky matching in school choice
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Publication:683828
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0995-YzbMath1398.91451OpenAlexW2276623850MaRDI QIDQ683828
Zeynel Harun Alioğulları, Mehmet Barlo, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
Publication date: 9 February 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0995-y
manipulationdeferred-acceptance mechanismefficiency-corrected deferred-acceptance mechanismefficiency-improving deferred-acceptance mechanismstickiness degreesticky-stability
Related Items (4)
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ School choice with vouchers ⋮ Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges
Cites Work
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Making just school assignments
- School Choice with Consent*
- Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
- School choice under partial fairness
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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