Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:684170
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.005zbMath1393.91004OpenAlexW2759098376MaRDI QIDQ684170
Publication date: 9 February 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81460/1/MPRA_paper_81460.pdf
Related Items
Ordinal status games on networks ⋮ When ``better is better than ``best ⋮ On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information ⋮ Equilibria in ordinal status games
Cites Work
- Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Existence of pure Nash equilibria in discontinuous and non quasiconcave games
- Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
- Strategic approximations of discontinuous games
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the existence of maximal elements
- Maximal elements of acyclic relations on compact sets
- A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
- Weak and strong monotone comparative statics
- Potential games
- Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set
- Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
- On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies
- The single deviation property in games with discontinuous payoffs
- Increasing selections from increasing multifunctions
- Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
- On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Continuity of Preference Relations for Separable Topologies
- Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses
- Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem
- The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems
