Pollution control: A differential game approach

DOI10.1007/BF02071061zbMath0802.90141OpenAlexW1988293563MaRDI QIDQ684778

Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date: 6 October 1993

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02071061

zbMATH Keywords

limit cyclesbifurcationscooperationtwo countriesemittance of pollutantsopen-loop Nashopen-loop Stackelberg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic growth models (91B62) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Bifurcations of limit cycles and periodic orbits in dynamical systems (37G15) Local and nonlocal bifurcation theory for dynamical systems (37G99)

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Cites Work

• Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical systems, and bifurcations of vector fields
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Optimal pollution control with a nonconstant exponential rate of decay
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation

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