A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

DOI10.1007/BF01234799zbMath0776.90008MaRDI QIDQ685033

Jacek Prokop, Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 21 September 1993

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdebt overhanginternational financial problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

On the probability of breakdown in participation games ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bank Heterogeneity, Reputation and Debt Renegotiation
• Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

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