On strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-CzbMath0810.90004OpenAlexW2020477741MaRDI QIDQ687046

Aleksandr I. Sotskov, Vladimir I. Danilov

Publication date: 2 December 1993

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-c

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumeliminable blockingselimination schemestrongly consistent social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Vetoing in social choice with blockings ⋮ Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.

Cites Work

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• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

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