Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
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Publication:687048
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90022-DzbMath0786.90003MaRDI QIDQ687048
Publication date: 2 December 1993
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- On Arrow-type impossibility theorems with infinite individuals and infinite alternatives
- Semiorders and collective choice
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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