A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90023-EzbMath0797.90009OpenAlexW2051635307MaRDI QIDQ687051

Taesung Kim

Publication date: 2 December 1993

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90023-e

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityNash equilibriaimplementationglobally stable equilibriaLindahl equilibriatwo-good economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (8)

A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results ⋮ Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods ⋮ Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Stability of the Gradient Process in n-Person Games
• Nonmyopic Strategic Behavior in the MDP Planning Procedure
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem

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