Strategic stability in repeated signaling games

DOI10.1007/BF01243645zbMath0791.90081OpenAlexW2087225854MaRDI QIDQ687058

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 20 July 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243645

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionforward inductionrepeated signaling gamesstrategically stable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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