Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function

DOI10.1007/BF01240054zbMath0794.90082OpenAlexW2039636922MaRDI QIDQ687989

Masayoshi Mizutani, Hisakazu Nishino, Yasuhiko Hiraide

Publication date: 31 August 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240054

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceeffectivity functionstrong cyclepreference order of each playerScarf balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Implementation by mediated equilibrium ⋮ Computational complexity in the design of voting rules

Cites Work

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms

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