Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
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Publication:687995
DOI10.1007/BF01240058zbMath0800.90789MaRDI QIDQ687995
Charles A. Holt, Jordi Brandts
Publication date: 28 November 1993
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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