Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games

DOI10.1007/BF01240058zbMath0800.90789MaRDI QIDQ687995

Charles A. Holt, Jordi Brandts

Publication date: 28 November 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites Work

• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria