Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict

DOI10.1007/BF01074957zbMath0782.90004MaRDI QIDQ688540

I. D. A. Macintyre

Publication date: 10 January 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingmanipulationinterpersonal comparabilityRawlsian justice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note ⋮ Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• The Pareto rule and strategic voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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