Common belief and common knowledge
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Publication:690342
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-NzbMath0794.90010OpenAlexW2166172407MaRDI QIDQ690342
Shmuel Zamir, Spyros Vassilakis
Publication date: 31 August 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-n
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