Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
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Publication:690685
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0490-9zbMath1263.91005OpenAlexW2076507138MaRDI QIDQ690685
Richard Cornes, Roger T. Hartley
Publication date: 28 November 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-0806.pdf
Related Items (18)
On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Asymmetric endogenous prize contests ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment ⋮ Expectations-based loss aversion in contests ⋮ Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud ⋮ Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests ⋮ The power of money: wealth effects in contests ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests ⋮ Endogenous entry in contests ⋮ Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests ⋮ Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times ⋮ Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests
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