The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
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Publication:690970
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001zbMath1263.91013OpenAlexW2130212269MaRDI QIDQ690970
Souvik Roy, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Publication date: 29 November 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001
Related Items (11)
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules ⋮ Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Voting under constraints
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting by Committees
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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