The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001zbMath1263.91013OpenAlexW2130212269MaRDI QIDQ690970

Souvik Roy, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 29 November 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessgeneralized random dictatorshiplexicographically separable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules ⋮ Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Voting under constraints
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Voting by Committees
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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