Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
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Publication:690981
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.08.009zbMath1263.91020OpenAlexW2013892100MaRDI QIDQ690981
Publication date: 29 November 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/75036/1/1_s2.0_S030440681200064X_main.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (2)
Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
Cites Work
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- Bargaining and Value
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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