On capturing rent from a non-renewable resource international monopoly: prices versus quantities

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0035-2zbMath1252.91069OpenAlexW1968340096MaRDI QIDQ692112

Santiago J. Rubio

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0035-2

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesnon-renewable resourcesMarkov perfect Nash equilibriumdepletion effectslinear strategiesprice-setting monopolistquantity-setting monopolisttariffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Using taxes to manage energy resources related to stock pollutants: resource cartel \textit{versus} importers

Cites Work

• Perfect equilibrium timing of a backstop technology. Limit pricing induced by trigger zones
• Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources
• Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?
• Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing

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