Intuitionistic epistemic logic, Kripke models and Fitch's paradox

DOI10.1007/s10992-011-9207-1zbMath1280.03020OpenAlexW2018517747MaRDI QIDQ692189

Carlo Proietti

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9207-1

zbMATH Keywords

Kripke modelsintuitionistic logicepistemic logicFitch's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (7)

Intuitionistic Epistemology and Modal Logics of Verification ⋮ Intuitionistic common knowledge or belief ⋮ Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication ⋮ A first-order expansion of Artemov and Protopopescu's intuitionistic epistemic logic ⋮ The Church-Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory ⋮ INTUITIONISTIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

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• Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics
• Models for stronger normal intuitionistic modal logics
• On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic
• Mathematical modal logic: A view of its evolution
• Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief
• What one may come to know

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