Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?

DOI10.1007/s13194-010-0007-1zbMath1348.62011OpenAlexW2064374748MaRDI QIDQ693099

Brian Laetz

Publication date: 7 December 2012

Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-010-0007-1

zbMATH Keywords

BayesianismCarl Hempelparadox of confirmationparadox of the ravens

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Cites Work

• How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

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