Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.010zbMath1283.91101OpenAlexW3124845919MaRDI QIDQ694727

Michael Raith

Publication date: 13 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

performance measurementinformativenessoptimal incentivesintertemporal consumptiontimeliness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
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• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation

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