Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
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Publication:694743
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.006zbMath1260.91113OpenAlexW2345033355MaRDI QIDQ694743
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11456/1/MPRA_paper_11456.pdf
dynamic mechanism designsequential allocationsequential ascending auctionsindirect mechanismsrandom arrivals
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