Locally robust implementation and its limits
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012zbMath1276.91080OpenAlexW2132105654MaRDI QIDQ694745
Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Philippe Jehiel
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012
ex-post implementationbilinear value functionlocally robust implementationquasi-linear Bernoulli utility functionregular allocation function
Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (6)
Cites Work
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