A characterization of the plurality rule
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Publication:694893
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.025zbMath1253.91063OpenAlexW2002585904MaRDI QIDQ694893
Publication date: 19 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.025
Related Items (9)
Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best-worst rule ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness ⋮ Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited ⋮ Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number ⋮ A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number
Cites Work
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Voting by Committees
- Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
- Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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