Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.009zbMath1253.91062OpenAlexW2002218499MaRDI QIDQ694917

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremoption sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

This page was built for publication: Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem