On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.059zbMath1253.91025OpenAlexW1988866127MaRDI QIDQ694942

Nicholas Shunda, James W. Boudreau

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24640/1/MPRA_paper_24640.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

preference evolutioncontestevolutionarily stable preferencesprize valuation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations

Cites Work

• Endogenous entry in contests
• The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets.
• Altruism and envy in contests: an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
• Contest success functions
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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