Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

DOI10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001zbMath1323.91007OpenAlexW2001999819MaRDI QIDQ695222

Flávio Ferreira, Oana Ruxandra Tuns (Bode)

Publication date: 20 December 2012

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationgame theorylicensingindustrial organizationStackelberg modelR\&D investments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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