Self-selection consistent functions

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2860zbMath1009.91005OpenAlexW2085245624MaRDI QIDQ697836

Carmen Beviá, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 17 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2a05f9423d1fc7a3eb3b0ede231d3ce205f603e5

zbMATH Keywords

social choice rulesparticipationallocation consistencycondorcet criterion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
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