Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
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Publication:697848
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2855zbMath1023.91009OpenAlexW2040053265MaRDI QIDQ697848
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1301.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items
COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ⋮ Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects ⋮ Communication and bargaining in the spatial model ⋮ Comparative cheap talk ⋮ The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Language and coordination games ⋮ Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
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- Strategic Information Transmission
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
