Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2891zbMath1051.91004OpenAlexW2121628994MaRDI QIDQ697849

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 17 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2891

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

Cites Work

• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

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