Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:697929
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2803zbMath1018.91002OpenAlexW2035950711MaRDI QIDQ697929
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/99584ba41a7b5501eb2931feb3d763dc921a71d0
Related Items (9)
The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument ⋮ How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters ⋮ A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. ⋮ Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms ⋮ Stochastic stability in a double auction ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
This page was built for publication: Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
