A backward induction experiment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:697945
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2910zbMath1015.91015OpenAlexW2106419811MaRDI QIDQ697945
Giovanni Ponti, Avner Shaked, John McCarthy, Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/48f7105c68f45394620b5b3ecacaecea9547e8a8
Related Items (24)
Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process ⋮ Non-equilibrium play in centipede games ⋮ Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight ⋮ How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information? ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making ⋮ Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning? ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees ⋮ The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game ⋮ Foresight, risk attitude, and utility maximization in naturalistic sequential high-stakes decision making ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot ⋮ Introduction to experimental game theory ⋮ Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining ⋮ Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game ⋮ Learning across games ⋮ Limited foresight equilibrium ⋮ Economic harmony -- a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions ⋮ Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information ⋮ An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
Cites Work
- Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
- Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study
- More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
- An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games
- Measuring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in a simple dilemma game
- What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence.
- Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
- Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
- Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis
- Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies
- Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: A backward induction experiment
