Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
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Publication:697946
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2832zbMath1015.91005OpenAlexW1968061316MaRDI QIDQ697946
Abdullah Yavas, Martin Sefton, Elena Katok
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/06067e8eaa96f945131f1f57f5d847ceb301f76b
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Cites Work
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- The chain store paradox
- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
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