Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
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Publication:697948
DOI10.1006/jeth.2002.2927zbMath1015.91011OpenAlexW2146289454WikidataQ58482953 ScholiaQ58482953MaRDI QIDQ697948
Juin-Kuan Chong, Teck-Hua Ho, Colin F. Camerer
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c838c74d999245f67bb6f89be474cbda2073c369
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