Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2912zbMath1015.91012OpenAlexW2042629872MaRDI QIDQ697953

Raymond C. Battalio, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/90d9c0dd94314f059b5e3434a3bc52e1b73b2641

zbMATH Keywords

learningequilibrium selectionbargainingevolutionary gamesgender differences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games ⋮ The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games ⋮ Introduction to experimental game theory ⋮ Choosing bargaining partners-an experimental study on the impact of information about income, status and gender

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism

This page was built for publication: Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games