Strategy-proof location on a network

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2807zbMath1027.91022OpenAlexW1970301801MaRDI QIDQ697960

Rakesh V. Vohra, James Schummer

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1253.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

graphslocationstrategy-proofsingle-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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