Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing

DOI10.1007/s712-002-8220-0zbMath1010.91081OpenAlexW2083262948MaRDI QIDQ698192

Barnali Gupta, Guhan Venkatu

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s712-002-8220-0

zbMATH Keywords

locationdelivered pricingduopoloytacit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (8)

Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model ⋮ ENDOGENOUS FLEXIBILITY IN THE FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM ⋮ Consistent location conjectures under spatial price discrimination ⋮ Mixed oligopolies and collusion ⋮ Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model ⋮ Spatial price discrimination in the unidirectional Hotelling model with elastic demand ⋮ The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts ⋮ Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly

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