Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises

DOI10.1007/s712-002-8221-xzbMath1010.91062OpenAlexW1973295636MaRDI QIDQ698194

Christina E. Metz

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40288

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriacurrency crisesself-fulfilling expectationsprivate and public information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (8)

CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS ⋮ Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Information quality and crises in regime-change games ⋮ An interpretation of the collapsing process of the Bretton Woods system ⋮ Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games. ⋮ Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

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