Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/BF01231553zbMath1010.91014MaRDI QIDQ698231

Frederik Andersson

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsignallingbilateral asymmetric informationgenetic informationsimple contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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