Strategic delegation under quality competition

DOI10.1007/BF02339580zbMath1020.91036OpenAlexW2071618735MaRDI QIDQ698257

Koji Ishibashi

Publication date: 9 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02339580

zbMATH Keywords

salesprofitscompensation schemesstrategic manipulations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (4)

Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ Congestion-reducing investments and economic welfare in a Hotelling model ⋮ Price and quality competition ⋮ A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

Cites Work

• Quality competition, welfare, and regulation
• Quality and Quantity Competition
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

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