Collusive outcomes in price competition.

DOI10.1007/BF02339582zbMath1054.91532OpenAlexW2102017916MaRDI QIDQ698262

Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02339582

zbMATH Keywords

price competitioncollusionconvex cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (6)

On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium ⋮ Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry ⋮ Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly ⋮ A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints ⋮ Price competition or price leadership ⋮ Endogenous strategic variable in a mixed duopoly

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Finitely Repeated Games
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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