A behavioral learning process in games

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0841zbMath1019.91010OpenAlexW1968394721MaRDI QIDQ700080

Richard Topol, Bernard Walliser, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a4fb1285c1a5d29f837026d1de0deef870c4f3e5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumtwo-player gamecumulative proportional reinforcementcumulative utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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