Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0850zbMath1025.91006OpenAlexW2144523988MaRDI QIDQ700081

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143790

zbMATH Keywords

individual preferencesdivision problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
• Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• Voting by Committees
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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