Game theory via revealed preferences

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0845zbMath1022.91008OpenAlexW2089712618MaRDI QIDQ700086

Lin Zhou, Indrajit Ray

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2000/0015.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (18)

Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees ⋮ Identification of payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy ⋮ Efficient and non-deteriorating choice. ⋮ Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ The testable implications of zero-sum games ⋮ On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification. ⋮ A nonparametric analysis of multi-product oligopolies ⋮ A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules ⋮ Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable ⋮ Embedded choices ⋮ Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries ⋮ Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

Cites Work

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• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• Revealed Preference Theory
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

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