Coalition formation and potential games

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0846zbMath1037.91010OpenAlexW2102900308MaRDI QIDQ700088

Marco Slikker

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/17699c24d64eeba57bf6b3f3cd5abdcaae3e6000

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formationEquilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

The cutting power of preparation ⋮ Potentials and reduced games for share functions ⋮ Stable governments and the semistrict core ⋮ POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION

Cites Work

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• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• Potential games
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• Potential maximizers and network formation
• Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games.
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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