The scholarship assignment problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:700089
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0852zbMath1023.91001OpenAlexW2146393798MaRDI QIDQ700089
Pablo Amorós, Bernardo Moreno, Luis C. Corchon
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3934
Related Items
Selecting winners with partially honest jurors, Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms, Picking the winners, Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents, Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction, Symmetry and impartial lotteries, Evaluation and strategic manipulation, An incentive dynamic programming method for the optimization of scholarship assignment, Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties, A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites, Implementation Theory, A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants, Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors, Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
Cites Work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
